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Abstract
The core of our article is the computability of the problem of deciding the modal definability of first-order sentences with
respect to classes of frames. It gives a new proof of Chagrova’s Theorem telling that, with respect to the class of all frames,
the problem of deciding the modal definability of first-order sentences is undecidable. It also gives the proofs of new variants
of Chagrova’s Theorem.
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1 Introduction
Modal formulas can be used to define classes of frames. In many cases, they define classes of
frames that cannot be defined by first-order sentences. As well, there exists sentences, such as the
ones describing the frame properties of irreflexivity and anti-symmetry, that no modal formula can
define. Hence, questions about the correspondences between modal formulas and sentences arise:
which sentences are modally definable, which modal formulas are first-order definable. The study
of these correspondences was begun in the 1970s. Now, it has a comprehensive literature. See [4,
15, 25] or [5, Chapter 3] for an introductory discussion about similar correspondence results. The
characterization of Goldblatt and Thomason [15] tells us that a sentence is modally definable iff it
is preserved under taking disjoint union, generated subframes and bounded morphic images and it
reflects ultrafilter extensions.Although it can be used to give algorithmic and graph-theoretic criteria
of modal definability for restricted families of sentences [19], Goldblatt–Thomason Theorem cannot
be used to decide the modal definability of sentences: as shown by Chagrova [10], the problem of
deciding the modal definability of sentences is undecidable. See [6, 7, 11] or [9, Chapter 17] for
an introductory discussion about similar undecidability results. Concerning modal definability, the
above lines seem to imply that the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences is the
only problem of interest. In our opinion, when we are using a modal language, it is also interesting
to consider the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to some specific
classes of frames (the class of all reflexive frames, the class of all strict partial orders, etc.). The core
of our article is the modal definability of sentences with respect to classes of frames.
Surely, the most interesting contribution of Chagrova [10] is the undecidability of the first-
order definability of intuitionistic formulas. Nevertheless, in order to simplify the presentation of
our article, her result about the undecidability of the modal definability of sentences will also
be called ‘Chagrova’s Theorem’. The proof of Chagrova’s Theorem—the undecidability of the
modal definability of sentences—is based on the undecidability of a variant of the halting problem
concerning Minsky machines. It cannot be easily repeated for demonstrating that, with respect to
different classes of frames, the problem of deciding themodal definability of sentences is undecidable
too. In our article, by means of simple frame constructions, we give a new proof of Chagrova’s
Theorem (Corollary 1) and we repeat our proof for demonstrating that, with respect to different
classes of frames, the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences is undecidable too
(Corollaries 2–14). In some sense, our method might be called direct. Using the fact that ⊥ is not
a modal definition of a sentence D with respect to a class C of frames iff there exists a frame F in
C such that F |=D, we show how to reduce the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C
to the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to C (Theorem 1). This
reduction constitutes the key result of our method. We assume that the reader has enough experience
in modal logic and first-order logic to decide on the notions that we do not define in our article. From
now on, a frame will be a structure of the form F= (W ,R1,...,Rn) where W is a non-empty set of
worlds and R1, ..., Rn are binary relations onW . In Sections 2–5 and 6.1, nwill be equal to 1 whereas
in Section 6.2, n will be equal to 2. We shall say that a subset U of W is Ri-closed if for all states
s, t in F , if s is in U and sRit then t is in U. If Ri is an equivalence relation, an equivalence class
modulo Ri is said to be degenerate if it is a singleton. A list s1,...,sm of worlds in F will sometimes
be written s¯. We leave it to the context to determine the length of such list.
2 Modal language and truth
2.1 Modal language
Let us consider a countable set of propositional variables (with typical members denoted p, q, ...).
The set of all modal formulas (denoted φ, ψ , ...) is inductively defined as follows:
• φ ::=p |⊥|¬φ | (φ∨ψ) |✷φ.
We define the other Boolean constructs as usual. The modal formula ✸φ is obtained as the well-
known abbreviation: ✸φ ::=¬✷¬φ. We adopt the standard rules for omission of the parentheses.
2.2 Truth
A model based on a frame F= (W ,R) is a triple M= (W ,R,V ) where V is a function assigning to
each propositional variable p a subset V (p) ofW . Given a modelM= (W ,R,V ), the satisfiability of
a modal formula φ at a world s inM, in symbolsM,s |=φ, is inductively defined as follows:
• M,s |=p iff s∈V (p),
• M,s 6|=⊥,
• M,s |=¬φ iffM,s 6|=φ,
• M,s |=φ∨ψ iff eitherM,s |=φ, orM,s |=ψ ,
• M,s |=✷φ iff for all worlds t inM, if sRt thenM,t |=φ.
Obviously,M,s |=✸φ iff there exists a world t inM such that sRt andM,t |=φ. We shall say that
a modal formula φ is true in a modelM, in symbolsM |=φ, if φ is satisfied at all worlds inM. A
modal formula φ is said to be valid in a frame F , in symbols F |=φ, if φ is true in all models based
on F . We shall say that a modal formula φ is valid in a class C of frames, in symbols C |=φ, if φ is
valid in all frames in C. A frame F is said to be weaker than a frame F ′, in symbols FF ′, if for
all modal formulas φ, if F |=φ then F ′ |=φ.
2.3 Generated subframes and bounded morphisms
Let F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) be frames. We shall say that F ′ is a generated subframe of F if the
following conditions are satisfied:
• F ′ is a subframe of F ,
• for all worlds s′ in F ′ and for all worlds t in F , if s′Rt then t is in F ′.
Generated subframes give rise to the following
Lemma 1 (Generated Subframe Lemma)
Let F , F ′ be frames. If F ′ is a generated subframe of F then FF ′.
Proof. See [5, Theorem 3.14 (ii)]. 
Let F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) be frames. A function f assigning to each world s in F a world f (s) in
F ′ is called a bounded morphism from F to F ′ if the following conditions are satisfied:
• for all worlds s, t in F , if sRt then f (s)R′f (t); and
• for all worlds s in F and for all worlds t′ in F ′, if f (s)R′t′ then there exists a world t in F such
that sRt and f (t)= t′.
F ′ is said to be a bounded morphic image of F if there exists a surjective bounded morphism from
F to F ′. Bounded morphic images give rise to the following
Lemma 2 (Bounded Morphism Lemma)
Let F , F ′ be frames. If F ′ is a bounded morphic image of F then FF ′.
Proof. See [5, Theorem 3.14 (iii)]. 
3 First-order language and truth
3.1 First-order language
Let us consider a countable set of individual variables (with typical members denoted x, y, ...). A list
x1,...,xm of individual variables will sometimes be written x¯. We leave it to the context to determine
the length of such list. The set of all first-order formulas (denoted A, B, ...) is inductively defined as
follows:
• A ::=R✷(x,y) |x=y |¬A | (A∨B) |∀x A.
Wedefine the otherBoolean constructs as usual.The first-order formula∃x A is obtained as thewell-
known abbreviation: ∃x A ::=¬∀x ¬A. We adopt the standard rules for omission of the parentheses.
For all first-order formulas A, let fiv(A) be the set of all free individual variables occurring in A.When
x¯ is a list of pairwise distinct individual variables, we write A(x¯) to denote a first-order formula A
whose free individual variables belongs to x¯. Afirst-order formula A is called a sentence if fiv(A)=∅.
The relativization of a first-order formula C with respect to a first-order formula A and an individual
variable x, in symbols (C)Ax , is inductively defined as follows:
• (R✷(y,z))Ax is R✷(y,z),
• (y=z)Ax is y=z,
• (¬C)Ax is ¬(C)Ax ,
• (C∨D)Ax is (C)Ax ∨(D)Ax ,
• (∀y C)Ax is ∀y (A[x/y]→ (C)Ax ).
In the above definition, A[x/y] denotes the first-order formula obtained from the first-order formula
A by replacing every free occurrence of the individual variable x in A by the individual variable
y. From now on, when we write (C)Ax , we will always assume that the sets of individual variables
occurring in A andC are disjoint. The reader may easily verify by induction on the first-order formula
C that fiv((C)Ax )⊆ (fiv(A)\{x})∪fiv(C). Hence, if C is a sentence then fiv((C)Ax )⊆fiv(A)\{x}. Let Ŵ,
1 be disjoint sets of sentences. We shall say that Ŵ and 1 are recursively inseparable if there exists
no recursive set 3 of sentences such that Ŵ⊆3 and 1∩3=∅. In this case, remark that neither Ŵ,
nor 1 is recursive. Moreover, if Ŵ (respectively, 1) is r.e. then Ŵ’s complement (respectively, 1’s
complement) is co-r.e.-hard. See [24, Chapter 7] for an introductory discussion about disjoint pairs
of sets.
3.2 Truth
Given a frame F= (W ,R), the satisfiability of a first-order formula A(x¯) in F with respect to a list s¯
of worlds in F , in symbols F |=A(x¯) [s¯], is inductively defined as follows:
• F |=R✷(xi,xj) [s¯] iff siRsj,
• F |=xi=xj [s¯] iff si=sj,
• F |=¬A [s¯] iff F 6|=A [s¯],
• F |=A∨B [s¯] iff either F |=A [s¯], or F |=B [s¯],
• F |=∀x A(x¯,x) [s¯] iff for all worlds s in F , F |=A(x¯,x) [s¯,s].
Obviously, F |=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯] iff there exists a world s in F such that F |=A(x¯,x) [s¯,s]. We shall say
that a first-order formula A(x¯) is valid in a frame F , in symbols F |=A(x¯), if A(x¯) is satisfied in F
with respect to all lists s¯ of worlds in F . A first-order formula A is said to be valid in a class C of
frames, in symbols C |=A, if A is valid in all frames in C.
3.3 Relativizations
Let F , F ′ be frames. We shall say that F ′ is the relativized reduct of F if there exists a first-order
formula A(x¯,x) and there exists a list s¯ of worlds in F such that F ′ is the restriction of F to the set
of all worlds s in F such that F |=A(x¯,x) [s¯,s]. In this case, F ′ is called the relativized reduct of F
with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯. Obviously, F possesses a relativized reduct with respect to A(x¯,x) and
s¯ iff F |=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯]. Relativized reducts give rise to the following.
Lemma 3 (Relativization Theorem)
Let F , F ′ be frames, A(x¯,x) be a first-order formula and s¯ be a list of worlds in F . If F ′ is the
relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯ then for all first-order formulas C(y¯) and for all
lists t¯ of worlds in F ′, F |= (C(y¯))A(x¯,x)x [s¯, t¯] iff F ′ |=C(y¯) [t¯].
Proof. See [17, Theorem 5.1.1]. 
4 Modal definability
Let C be a class of frames. A sentence A is said to be modally definable with respect to C if there
exists a modal formula φ such that for all frames F in C, F |=A iff F |=φ. In this case, we shall say
that φ is a modal definition of A with respect to C. Now, we relate the problem of deciding the modal
definability of sentences with respect to C to the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C.
In this respect, a special role is played by the concept of a stable class of frames. C is said to be stable
if there exists a first-order formula A(x¯,x) and there exists a sentence B such that
(a) for all frames F in C, for all lists s¯ of worlds in F and for all frames F ′, if F ′ is the relativized
reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯ then F ′ is in C;
(b) for all frames F0 in C, there exists frames F , F ′ in C and there exists a list s¯ of worlds in F such
that F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and FF ′.
In this case, (A(x¯,x),B) is called a witness of the stability of C. The following theorem states that if
C is stable, then the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to C is at
least as difficult as the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C.
Theorem 1
If C is stable then the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C is reducible to the problem
of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to C.
Proof. Suppose C is stable. Let (A(x¯,x),B) be a witness of the stability of C. LetC be a sentence. Let
D be the sentence ∃x¯ (∃x A(x¯,x)∧¬(C)A(x¯,x)x )∧B, we demonstrate C |=C iff D is modally definable
with respect to C.
SupposeC |=C. For the sake of the contradiction, supposeD is notmodally definablewith respect toC.
LetF be a frame in C such thatF |=D. Such a frame exists, otherwise⊥would be a modal definition
of D with respect to C. Let s¯ be worlds in F such that F |=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯] and F 6|= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯].
Let F ′ be the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯. Such a frame exists, otherwise
F 6|=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯]. Since F is in C, by (a), F ′ is in C. Since F ′ is the relativized reduct of F with
respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯, by Lemma 3, F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯] iff F ′ |=C. Since F 6|= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯], F ′ 6|=C.
Since F ′ is in C, C 6|=C: a contradiction.
Suppose D is modally definable with respect to C. Let φ be a modal definition of D with respect to
C. For the sake of the contradiction, suppose C 6|=C. Let F0 be a frame in C such that F0 6|=C. Let
F , F ′ be frames in C and let s¯ be a list of worlds in F such that F0 is the relativized reduct of F
with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and FF ′. Since F0 is in C, by (b), such frames and
such a list of worlds exist. Since F ′ 6|=B, F ′ 6|=D. Since φ is a modal definition of D with respect
to C, F , F ′ are in C and FF ′, F 6|=D. Hence, either F 6|=∃x¯ (∃x A(x¯,x)∧¬(C)A(x¯,x)x ) or F 6|=B.
Since F |=B, F 6|=∃x¯ (∃x A(x¯,x)∧¬(C)A(x¯,x)x ). Since F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect
to A(x¯,x) and s¯, by Lemma 3, F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯] iff F0 |=C. Moreover, F |=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯]. Since F 6|=
∃x¯ (∃x A(x¯,x)∧¬(C)A(x¯,x)x ), either F 6|=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯], or F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯]. Since F |=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯],
F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯]. Since F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯] iff F0 |=C, F0 |=C: a contradiction. 
This tight relationship between the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with
respect to C and the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C constitutes the key result of our
method. The onlymodal-related constraint in condition (b) being thatFF ′, themodal language and
its semantics are inessential in the proof of Theorem 1. A single property is really needed: the modal
language should contain or define a formula, such as ⊥, that is valid in no C-frame. In other respect,
in order to achieve the constraint that FF ′, let us note that there is no obligation to use the frame
constructions of generated subframes and bounded morphic images considered in Section 2.3: any
frame construction preserving frame-validity could be used as well. Now, we will use Theorem 1 in
order to investigate the computability of the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences
with respect to the class Call of all frames.
Theorem 2
Call is stable.
Proof. Let A(x1,x) be the first-order formula R✷(x1,x). Let B be the sentence ∀y ∃z R✷(z,y).
Obviously, Call and A(x1,x) satisfy the condition (a). As for the condition (b), let F0= (W0,R0)
be a frame in Call. Consider the frames F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) in Call defined as follows:
• W =W0∪{s1,t1},
• R is the least relation on W containing R0, {s1}×W0, (t1,s1) and (t1,t1),
• W ′=W0∪{s1},
• R′ is the least relation on W ′ containing R0 and {s1}×W0.
Obviously, F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x1,x) and s1, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′ is
a generated subframe of F . 
In the above proof of Theorem 2, we assume that s1 and t1 are distinct new elements, i.e. s1 6= t1,
s1 6∈W0 and t1 6∈W0.Analogous assumptions will bemade in the proofs of analogous theorems below.
Putting Theorems 1 and 2 together leads us to a new proof of Chagrova’s Theorem.
Corollary 1 (Chagrova’s Theorem)
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to Call is undecidable.
Proof. By [18], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in a first-order language with at
least one non-logical symbol, which is a predicate of arity 2 or more, is reducible to the problem
of deciding the validity of sentences in a first-order language with exactly one non-logical symbol,
which is a predicate of arity 2. The conclusion follows by Theorems 1 and 2 and the well-known
undecidability of the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in a first-order language.

In the proof of Theorem 2, if the frame F0 is finite then the frames F , F ′ are finite too. This
immediately gives us the following.
Theorem 3
The class Cfinall of all finite frames is stable.
Putting Theorems 1 and 3 together leads us to a proof of the following new result.
Corollary 2
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to Cfinall is co-r.e.-hard.
Proof. By [29], the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable: {A: Call |=A} and {A:
Cfinall 6|=A}. Since {A: C
fin
all 6|=A} is r.e., the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C
fin
all is
co-r.e.-hard. The conclusion follows by Theorems 1 and 3. 
5 Stable classes of frames
The frame manipulation method we have used to prove Theorem 2 is flexible. It has many interesting
variations. The following theorem explores this theme.
Theorem 4
The following classes of frames are stable: (1) the class Cref of all reflexive frames; (2) the class
Csym of all symmetric frames; (3) the class Ctra of all transitive frames; (4) the class Cref ,sym of all
reflexive symmetric frames; (5) the class Cref ,tra of all reflexive transitive frames.
Proof. (1) Let A(x1,x) be the first-order formula R✷(x1,x)∧x1 6=x. Let B be the sentence
∀y ∃z (R✷(z,y)∧z 6=y). Obviously, Cref and A(x1,x) satisfy the condition (a).As for the condition (b),
let F0= (W0,R0) be a frame in Cref . Consider the frames F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) in Cref defined
as follows:
• W =W0∪{s1,t11,t12},
• R is the least reflexive relation on W containing R0, {s1}×W0, (t11,s1), (t12,s1), (t12,t11) and
(t11,t12),
• W ′=W0∪{s1},
• R′ is the least reflexive relation on W ′ containing R0 and {s1}×W0.
Obviously, F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x1,x) and s1, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′ is
a generated subframe of F .
(2) Let A(x1,x2,x) be the first-order formula R✷(x1,x)∧R✷(x2,x). Let B be the sentence
∀y ∃z1 ∃z2 (R✷(z1,y)∧z1 6=y∧R✷(z2,y)∧z2 6=y∧z1 6=z2). Obviously, Csym and A(x1,x2,x) satisfy
the condition (a). As for the condition (b), let F0= (W0,R0) be a frame in Csym. Consider the frames
F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) in Csym defined as follows:
• W =W0∪{s1,s2,t11,t12,t21,t22},
• R is the least symmetric relation on W containing R0, {s1,s2}×W0, (t11,s1), (t12,s1), (t21,s2),
(t22,s2), (t12,t11) and (t22,t21),
• W ′=W0∪{s′1,s
′
2,t
′
1,t
′
2},
• R′ is the least symmetric relation onW ′ containing R0, {s′1,s
′
2}×W0, (t′1,s′1), (t′2,s′2), (t′1,t′1) and
(t′2,t′2).
Obviously,F0 is the relativized reduct ofF with respect to A(x1,x2,x) and s1,s2,F |=B,F ′ 6|=B and
F ′ is a bounded morphic image of F .
(3) Let A(x1,x) be the first-order formula R✷(x1,x). Let B be the sentence ∀y ∃z R✷(z,y). Obviously,
Ctra and A(x1,x) satisfy the condition (a). As for the condition (b), let F0= (W0,R0) be a frame in
Ctra. Consider the frames F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) in Ctra defined as follows:
• W =W0∪{s1,t1},
• R is the least transitive relation on W containing R0, {s1}×W0, (t1,s1) and (t1,t1),
• W ′=W0∪{s1},
• R′ is the least transitive relation on W ′ containing R0 and {s1}×W0.
Obviously, F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x1,x) and s1, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′ is
a generated subframe of F .
(4) Similar to the proof of item (2).
(5) LetA(x1,x) be the first-order formulaR✷(x1,x)∧x1 6=x. LetB be the sentence∀y ∃z (R✷(z,y)∧z 6=
y). Obviously, Cref ,tra and A(x1,x) satisfy the condition (a).As for the condition (b), letF0= (W0,R0)
be a frame in Cref ,tra. Consider the frames F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) in Cref ,tra defined as follows:
• W =W0∪{s1,t11,t12},
• R is the least reflexive transitive relation on W containing R0, {s1}×W0, (t11,s1), (t12,s1),
(t12,t11) and (t11,t12),
• W ′=W0∪{s1},
• R′ is the least reflexive transitive relation on W ′ containing R0 and {s1}×W0.
Obviously, F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x1,x) and s1, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′ is
a generated subframe of F . 
Putting Theorems 1 and 4 together leads us to a proof of
Corollary 3
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to the following classes of
frames is undecidable: (1) Cref ; (2) Csym; (3) Ctra; (4) Cref ,sym; (5) Cref ,tra.
Proof. (1) By [27], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in lattices is undecidable. Since
the first-order theory of lattices is a finite extension of the first-order theory of Cref , by [28, Theorem
5, Page 17], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Cref is undecidable. The conclusion
follows by Theorem 1 and item (1) of Theorem 4.
(2) By [12], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Csym is undecidable. The conclusion
follows by Theorem 1 and item (2) of Theorem 4.
(3) Similar to the proof of item (1).
(4) By [23], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Cref ,sym is undecidable. The
conclusion follows by Theorem 1 and item (4) of Theorem 4.
(5) Similar to the proof of item (1). 
Cpar denoting the class of all partitions, let us remark, as proved in [1, 2], that the problem of deciding
the modal definability of sentences with respect to Cpar is PSPACE-complete. In each item of the
proof of Theorem 4, if the frame F0 is finite then the frames F , F ′ are finite too. This immediately
gives us the following.
Theorem 5
The following classes of frames are stable: (1) the class Cfin
ref of all finite reflexive frames; (2) the
class Cfinsym of all finite symmetric frames; (3) the class Cfintra of all finite transitive frames; (4) the class
Cfin
ref ,sym of all finite reflexive symmetric frames; (5) the class Cfinref ,tra of all finite reflexive transitive
frames.
Putting Theorems 1 and 5 together leads us to a proof of the following new results.
Corollary 4
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to the following classes of
frames is co-r.e.-hard: (1) Cfin
ref ; (2) Cfinsym; (3) Cfintra ; (4) Cfinref ,sym; (5) Cfinref ,tra.
Proof. (1) By [26], Cpo denoting the class of all partial orders and Cfinpo denoting the class of all
finite partial orders, the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable: {A: Cpo |=A} and {A:
Cfinpo 6|=A}. Since the first-order theory of Cpo is a finite extension of the first-order theory of Cref , by a
simple variant of [28, Theorem 5, p. 17], the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable:
{A: Cref |=A} and {A: Cfinref 6|=A}. Since {A: C
fin
ref 6|=A} is r.e., the problem of deciding the validity of
sentences in Cfin
ref is co-r.e.-hard. The conclusion follows by Theorem 1 and item (1) of Theorem 5.(2) By [20], the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable: {A: Csym |=A} and {A:
Cfinsym 6|=A}. Since {A: Cfinsym 6|=A} is r.e., the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Cfinsym is
co-r.e.-hard. The conclusion follows by Theorem 1 and item (2) of Theorem 5.
(3) Similar to the proof of item (1).
(4) By [20], the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable: {A: Cref ,sym |=A} and {A:
Cfin
ref ,sym 6|=A}. Since {A: C
fin
ref ,sym 6|=A} is r.e., the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in
Cfin
ref ,sym is co-r.e.-hard. The conclusion follows by Theorem 1 and item (4) of Theorem 5.
(5) Similar to the proof of item (1). 
The following theorem illustrates again the flexibility of the frame manipulation method we have
used to prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 6
The following classes of frames are stable: (1) the class Cspo of all strict partial orders; (2) Cpo.
Proof. (1) Let A(x1,x2,x) be the first-order formula R✷(x1,x)∧R✷(x2,x). Let B be the sentence
∃y ∀z (y=z∨R✷(y,z)). Obviously, Cspo and A(x1,x2,x) satisfy the condition (a). As for the
condition (b), let F0= (W0,R0) be a frame in Cspo. Consider the frames F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) in
Cspo defined as follows:
• W =W0∪{s1,s2,t},
• R is the least transitive relation on W containing R0, {s1,s2}×W0, (t,s1) and (t,s2),
• W ′=W0∪{s1,s2},
• R′ is the least transitive relation on W ′ containing R0 and {s1,s2}×W0.
Obviously,F0 is the relativized reduct ofF with respect to A(x1,x2,x) and s1,s2,F |=B,F ′ 6|=B and
F ′ is a generated subframe of F .
(2) Similar to the proof of item (1). 
Putting Theorems 1 and 6 together leads us to a proof of the following new results.
Corollary 5
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to the following classes of
frames is undecidable: (1) Cspo; (2) Cpo.
Proof. (1) By [27], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in lattices is undecidable. Since
the first-order theory of lattices is a finite extension of the first-order theory of Cspo, by [28, Theorem
5, p. 17], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Cspo is undecidable. The conclusion
follows by Theorem 1 and item (1) of Theorem 6.
(2) Similar to the proof of item (1). 
In each item of the proof of Theorem 6, if the frame F0 is finite then the frames F , F ′ are finite too.
This immediately gives us the following
Theorem 7
The following classes of frames are stable: (1) the class Cfinspo of all finite strict partial orders; (2) Cfinpo .
Putting Theorems 1 and 7 together leads us to a proof of the following new results.
Corollary 6
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to the following classes of
frames is co-r.e.-hard: (1) Cfinspo; (2) Cfinpo .
Proof. (1) By [26], the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable: {A: Cspo |=A} and
{A: Cfinspo 6|=A}. Since {A: Cfinspo 6|=A} is r.e., the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Cfinspo is
co-r.e.-hard. The conclusion follows by Theorem 1 and item (1) of Theorem 7.
(2) Similar to the proof of item (1). 
6 Lattices, partitions and linear orders
Up to now, the classes of frames that we have considered were always definable by a universal
sentence. Moreover, we have always considered a modal language with only one modal connective
and a first-order languagewith only one relation symbol. In Section 6.1, we study the computability of
the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to a class of frames definable
by a universal-existential sentence. In this respect, we will consider the class of all lattices, i.e. partial
orders in which each pair of worlds has a greatest lower bound and a least upper bound. In Section 6.2,
we study the computability of the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences when the
modal language has two modal connectives and the first-order language has two relation symbols. In
this respect, we will consider the class of all bi-partitions, i.e. frames with two equivalence relations,
the class of all linear partitions, i.e. frames with a linear order and an equivalence relation, and the
class of all bilinear orders, i.e. frames with two linear orders.
6.1 Lattices
Remark that universal sentences are preserved under subframes. For this reason, obviously, each of
the classes of frames considered in Theorems 2, 4 and 6 satisfies the condition (a) for any first-order
formula A(x¯,x). Since the class Clat of all lattices is definable by a universal-existential sentence, the
formula A(x1,x) used in the proof of the following theorem has to be more specific.
Theorem 8
Clat is stable.
Proof. Let A(x1,x) be the first-order formula A′∧(A′′)A′x where A′ denotes the first-order formula
R✷(x1,x)∧x1 6=x and A′′ denotes the conjunction of the following sentences:
• ∀y R✷(y,y),
• ∀y ∀z (R✷(y,z)∧R✷(z,y)→y=z),
• ∀y ∀z ∀t (R✷(y,z)∧R✷(z,t)→R✷(y,t)),
• ∀y ∀z ∃t (R✷(t,y)∧R✷(t,z)∧∀u (R✷(u,y)∧R✷(u,z)→R✷(u,t))),
• ∀y ∀z ∃t (R✷(y,t)∧R✷(z,t)∧∀u (R✷(y,u)∧R✷(z,u)→R✷(t,u))).
Let B be the sentence ¬∃y ∃z (y 6=z∧∀t (R✷(y,t)∧(y 6= t→R✷(z,t)))). Remark that for all frames
F in Clat , for all worlds s1 inF and for all framesF ′, ifF ′ is the relativized reduct ofF with respect
to A(x1,x) and s1 then F ′ is in Clat . Hence, Clat and A(x1,x) satisfy the condition (a). As for the
condition (b), let F0= (W0,R0) be a frame in Clat . Consider the frames F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) in
Clat defined as follows:
• W =W0∪{s1,t1,u1,u2,v},
• R is the least reflexive transitive relation onW containing R0, {s1}×W0, (t1,s1), (u1,t1), (u2,t1)
and (v,u1),
• W ′=W0∪{s1,t1},
• R′ is the least reflexive transitive relation on W ′ containing R0, {s1}×W0 and (t1,s1).
Obviously, F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x1,x) and s1, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′
is a generated subframe of F . 
Putting Theorems 1 and 8 together leads us to a proof of the following new result.
Corollary 7
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to Clat is undecidable.
Proof. By [27], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in lattices is undecidable. The
conclusion follows by Theorems 1 and 8. 
In the proof of Theorem 8, if the frame F0 is finite then the frames F , F ′ are finite too. This
immediately gives us the following.
Theorem 9
The class Cfinlat of all finite lattices is stable.
Putting Theorems 1 and 9 together leads us to a proof of the following new result.
Corollary 8
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to Cfinlat is co-r.e.-hard.
Proof. By [26], the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable: {A: Clat |=A} and {A:
Cfinlat 6|=A}. Since {A: C
fin
lat 6|=A} is r.e., the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C
fin
lat is
co-r.e.-hard. The conclusion follows by Theorem 1 and 9. 
6.2 Partitions and linear orders
Let us consider the variant of our modal language with two modal connectives ✷1 and ✷2. Given
a model M= (W ,R1,R2,V ), the satisfiability of the modal formulas ✷1φ and ✷2φ at a world s in
M is defined by means of the binary relations R1 and R2 as expected. The concepts of a generated
subframe and a bounded morphic image being accordingly defined, invariance results such as the
ones described in Lemmas 1 and 2 can be easily obtained. Let us consider the variant of our first-order
language with two relation symbols R✷1 and R✷2 , the concept of a relativization being accordingly
defined. Given a frame F= (W ,R1,R2), the satisfiability of the first-order formulas R✷1 (xi,xj) and
R✷2 (xi,xj) with respect to a list s¯ of worlds in F is defined by means of the binary relations R1
and R2 as expected. The concept of a relativized reduct being accordingly defined, an invariance
result such as the one described in Lemma 3 can be easily obtained. A frame F= (W ,R1,R2)
is said to be a bi-partition if R1 and R2 are equivalence relations. We shall say that a frame
F= (W ,R1,R2) is a linear partition if R1 is a linear order and R2 is an equivalence relation. A
frame F= (W ,R1,R2) is said to be a bilinear order if R1 and R2 are linear orders. Now, defining
the concept of modal definability as in Section 4, let us see if results such as the ones described
in Corollaries 1 and 2 can be obtained too for bi-partitions and bilinear orders. We do not know
whether the class Cbip of all bi-partitions is stable. Nevertheless, it is still possible to prove the
following.
Theorem 10
The problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Cbip is reducible to the problem of deciding the
modal definability of sentences with respect to Cbip.
Proof. Let A(x1,x) be the first-order formula¬R✷1 (x1,x). LetC be a sentence. Let B be the sentence
∃y1 ...∃yd+1 B′ where d denotes the quantifier depth of C and B′ denotes the conjunction of the
following first-order formulas:
•
∧
{R✷1 (yi,yj): 1≤ i< j≤d+1},
•
∧
{¬R✷2 (yi,yj): 1≤ i< j≤d+1},
• ∀z ∀z′ (R✷1 (y1,z)∧R✷2 (z,z′)→R✷1 (y1,z′)),
• ∀z (R✷1 (y1,z)→∃z′ (R✷2 (z,z′)∧z 6=z′)).
Remark that for all frames F= (W ,R1,R2) in Cbip, F |=B iff there exists an R2-closed equivalence
class modulo R1 containing d+1 pairwise disjoint equivalence classes modulo R2 and containing no
degenerate equivalence class modulo R2. Let D be the sentence ∃x1 (∃x A(x1,x)∧¬(C)A(x1,x)x )∧B,
we demonstrate Cbip |=C iff D is modally definable with respect to Cbip. Contrary to what was the
situation in the proof of Theorem 1, remark that the B-part of D now depends on the given C.
Suppose Cbip |=C. For the sake of the contradiction, supposeD is not modally definable with respect
to Cbip. Following an argument similar to the one considered in the first part of the proof of Theorem 1,
the reader may easily obtain a contradiction.
Suppose D is modally definable with respect to Cbip. Let φ be a modal definition of D with respect
to Cbip. For the sake of the contradiction, suppose Cbip 6|=C. Let F0= (W0,R01,R02) be a frame
in Cbip such that F0 6|=C. We shall say that a R02-closed equivalence class U modulo R01 is d-
reparable if U contains d+1 pairwise disjoint equivalence classes modulo R02 and U contains no
degenerate equivalence class modulo R02. Let ·˜ be a function assigning to each d-reparable R02-
closed equivalence class U modulo R01 a subset U˜ of U consisting of exactly d equivalence classes
modulo R02. Let F1= (W1,R11,R12) be the subframe of F0 obtained by replacing each d-reparable
R02-closed equivalence class U modulo R01 by U˜. Obviously, F1 6|=B. Moreover, player ∃ has a
winning strategy in the Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game of length d on F0 and F1. As is well-known, the
d-roundEhrenfeucht–Fraïssé game captures elementary equivalence up to quantifier depth d. See [13,
Chapter 1] for an introductory discussion about similar characterization results. SinceC is a sentence
of quantifier depth d and F0 6|=C, F1 6|=C. Consider the frames F= (W ,R1,R2), F ′= (W ′,R′1,R′2)
in Cbip defined as follows:
• W =W1∪{s1,...,sd+1,sd+2,...,s2d+2},
• R1 is the least equivalence relation on W containing R11 and {(si,sj): 1≤ i< j≤2d+2},
• R2 is the least equivalence relation on W containing R12 and {(si,si+d+1): 1≤ i≤d+1},
• W ′=W1∪{s1,...,sd+1},
• R′1 is the least equivalence relation on W
′ containing R11 and {(si,sj): 1≤ i< j≤d+1},
• R′2 is the least equivalence relation on W
′ containing R12.
Obviously, F1 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x1,x) and s1, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′ is
a bounded morphic image of F . Following an argument similar to the one considered in the end of
the second part of the proof of Theorem 1, the reader may easily obtain a contradiction. 
Theorem 10 alone leads us to a proof of the following new result.
Corollary 9
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to Cbip is undecidable.
Proof. By [23], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Cbip is undecidable. The
conclusion follows by Theorem 10. 
Let Cfinbip be the class of all finite bi-partitions. In the proof of Theorem 10, if the frame F0 is finite
then the frames F , F ′ are finite too. This immediately gives us the following
Theorem 11
The problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Cfinbip is reducible to the problem of deciding the
modal definability of sentences with respect to Cfinbip.
Theorem 11 alone leads us to a proof of the following new result.
Corollary 10
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to Cfinbip is co-r.e.-hard.
Proof. By [20], the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable: {A: Cbip |=A} and {A:
Cfinbip 6|=A}. Since {A: C
fin
bip 6|=A} is r.e., the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C
fin
bip is
co-r.e.-hard. The conclusion follows by Theorem 11. 
As for the class Clip of all linear partitions, we have the following.
Theorem 12
Clip is stable.
Proof. Let A(x1,x) be the first-order formula R✷1 (x1,x)∧x1 6=x. Let B be the sentence
∃y (∀z R✷1 (y,z)∧∃z (R✷2 (y,z)∧y 6=z)). Obviously, Clip and A(x1,x) satisfy the condition (a). As
for the condition (b), letF0= (W0,R01,R02) be a frame in Clip. Consider the framesF= (W ,R1,R2),
F ′= (W ′,R′1,R′2) in Clip defined as follows:
• W =W0∪{s1,t},
• R1 is the least reflexive transitive relation on W containing R01, {s1}×W0 and (t,s1),
• R2 is the least equivalence relation on W containing R02 and (t,s1),
• W ′=W0∪{s′},
• R′1 is the least reflexive transitive relation on W
′ containing R01 and {s′}×W0,
• R′2 is the least equivalence relation on W
′ containing R02.
Obviously, F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x1,x) and s1, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′ is
a bounded morphic image of F . 
Putting Theorems 1 and 12 together leads us to a proof of the following new results.
Corollary 11
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect Clip is undecidable.
Proof. By [22, 23], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Clip is undecidable. The
conclusion follows by Theorems 1 and 12. 
In the proof of Theorem 12, if the frame F0 is finite then the frames F , F ′ are finite too. This
immediately gives us the following.
Theorem 13
The class Cfinlip of all finite linear partitions is stable.
Putting Theorems 1 and 13 together leads us to a proof of the following new results.
Corollary 12
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to Cfinlip is co-r.e.-hard.
Proof. By [20], the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable: {A: Clip |=A} and {A:
Cfinlip 6|=A}. Since {A: C
fin
lip 6|=A} is r.e., the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C
fin
lip is
co-r.e.-hard. The conclusion follows by Theorems 1 and 13. 
Concerning the class Cbil of all bilinear orders, we have the following.
Theorem 14
Cbil is stable.
Proof. Let A(x1,x2,x) be the first-order formula R✷1 (x1,x)∧R✷2 (x2,x). Let B be the sentence
¬∃y ∀z (R✷1 (y,z)∧R✷2 (y,z)). Obviously, Cbil and A(x1,x2,x) satisfy the condition (a). As for the
condition (b), let F0= (W0,R0) be a frame in Cbil. Consider the frames F= (W ,R), F ′= (W ′,R′) in
Cbil defined as follows:
• W =W0∪{s1,s2},
• R1 is the least reflexive transitive relation on W containing R0, {s1}×W0 and (s2,s1),
• R2 is the least reflexive transitive relation on W containing R0, {s2}×W0 and (s1,s2),
• W ′=W0∪{s′},
• R′1 is the least reflexive transitive relation on W
′ containing R0 and {s′}×W0,
• R′2 is the least reflexive transitive relation on W
′ containing R0 and {s′}×W0.
Obviously,F0 is the relativized reduct ofF with respect to A(x1,x2,x) and s1,s2,F |=B,F ′ 6|=B and
F ′ is a bounded morphic image of F . 
Putting Theorems 1 and 14 together leads us to a proof of the following new results.
Corollary 13
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect Cbil is undecidable.
Proof. By [22, 23], the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in Cbil is undecidable. The
conclusion follows by Theorem 1 and item Theorem 14. 
In the proof of Theorem 14, if the frame F0 is finite then the frames F , F ′ are finite too. This
immediately gives us the following.
Theorem 15
The class Cfinbil of all finite bilinear orders is stable.
Putting Theorems 1 and 15 together leads us to a proof of the following new results.
Corollary 14
The problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to Cfinbil is co-r.e.-hard.
Proof. By [20], the following sets of sentences are recursively inseparable: {A: Cbil |=A} and {A:
Cfinbil 6|=A}. Since {A: C
fin
bil 6|=A} is r.e., the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C
fin
bil is
co-r.e.-hard. The conclusion follows by Theorems 1 and 15. 
7 Final remarks
We shall say that a first-order formula
• A(x¯) is preserved under taking generated subframes if for all frames F , if F |=A(x¯) then for all
frames F ′, if F ′ is a generated subframe of F then F ′ |=A(x¯),
• A(x¯) is preserved under taking bounded morphisms if for all frames F , if F |=A(x¯) then for all
frames F ′, if F ′ is a bounded morphic image of F then F ′ |=A(x¯).
Let C be a class of frames. Theorem 1 can be changed in such a way that it states that if C is
stable then the problem of deciding the preservability under taking generated subframes of sentences
with respect to C and the problem of deciding the preservability under taking bounded morphisms of
sentences with respect to C are at least as difficult as the problem of deciding the validity of sentences
in C. In this respect, we need to change our definition of stability. C is said to be gs-stable (for
‘generated subframe stable’) if there exists a first-order formula A(x¯,x) and there exists a sentence B
such that
(a) for all frames F in C, for all lists s¯ of worlds in F and for all frames F ′, if F ′ is the relativized
reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯ then F ′ is in C,
(b) for all frames F0 in C, there exists frames F , F ′ in C and there exists a list s¯ of worlds in F such
that F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′ is a
generated subframe of F .
We shall say that C is bm-stable (for ‘bounded morphism stable’) if there exists a first-order formula
A(x¯,x) and there exists a sentence B such that
(a) for all frames F in C, for all lists s¯ of worlds in F and for all frames F ′, if F ′ is the relativized
reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯ then F ′ is in C,
(b) for all frames F0 in C, there exists frames F , F ′ in C and there exists a list s¯ of worlds in F such
that F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′ is a
bounded morphic image of F .
In both cases, (A(x¯,x),B) is called a witness of the stability of C. The following theorem states that
if C is gs-stable then the problem of deciding the preservability undertaking generated subframes of
sentences with respect to C is at least as difficult as the problem of deciding the validity of sentences
in C. As the reader will see, its proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 16
If C is gs-stable then the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C is reducible to the problem
of deciding the preservability undertaking generated subframes of sentences with respect to C.
Proof. Suppose C is gs-stable. Let (A(x¯,x),B) be a witness of the gs-stability of C. Let C be a
sentence. Let D be the sentence ∃x¯ (∃x A(x¯,x)∧¬(C)A(x¯,x)x )∧B, we demonstrate C |=C iff D is
preserved under taking generated subframes with respect to C.
Suppose C |=C. For the sake of the contradiction, supposeD is not preserved under taking generated
subframes with respect to C. Let F be a frame in C such that F |=D. Such a frame exists, otherwise
D would be preserved under taking generated subframes with respect to C. Let s¯ be worlds inF such
that F |=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯] and F 6|= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯]. Let F ′ be the relativized reduct of F with respect to
A(x¯,x) and s¯. Such a frame exists, otherwise F 6|=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯]. Since F is in C, by (a), F ′ is in C.
Since F ′ is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯, by Lemma 3, F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯]
iff F ′ |=C. Since F 6|= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯], F ′ 6|=C. Since F ′ is in C, C 6|=C: a contradiction.
Suppose D is preserved under taking generated subframes with respect to C. For the sake of the
contradiction, suppose C 6|=C. Let F0 be a frame in C such that F0 6|=C. Let F , F ′ be frames in C
and let s¯ be a list of worlds in F such that F0 is the relativized reduct of F with respect to A(x¯,x)
and s¯, F |=B, F ′ 6|=B and F ′ is a generated subframe of F . Since F0 is in C, by (b), such frames
and such a list of worlds exist. Since F ′ 6|=B, F ′ 6|=D. Since D is preserved under taking generated
subframeswith respect to C,F ,F ′ are in C andF ′ is a generated subframe ofF ,F 6|=D. Hence, either
F 6|=∃x¯ (∃x A(x¯,x)∧¬(C)A(x¯,x)x ), or F 6|=B. Since F |=B, F 6|=∃x¯ (∃x A(x¯,x)∧¬(C)A(x¯,x)x ). Since F0
is the relativized reduct ofF with respect to A(x¯,x) and s¯, by Lemma 3,F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯] iffF0 |=C.
Moreover, F |=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯]. Since F 6|=∃x¯ (∃x A(x¯,x)∧¬(C)A(x¯,x)x ), either F 6|=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯], or
F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯]. Since F |=∃x A(x¯,x) [s¯], F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯]. Since F |= (C)A(x¯,x)x [s¯] iff F0 |=C,
F0 |=C: a contradiction. 
The following theorem states that if C is bm-stable then the problem of deciding the preservability
under taking bounded morphisms of sentences with respect to C is at least as difficult as the problem
of deciding the validity of sentences in C.
Theorem 17
If C is bm-stable then the problem of deciding the validity of sentences in C is reducible to the problem
of deciding the preservability under taking bounded morphisms of sentences with respect to C.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 16. 
From the proofs of Theorems 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 14, the reader may easily conclude that:
Theorem 18
The following classes of frames are gs-stable: (1) Call; (2) Cref ; (3) Ctra; (4) Cref ,tra; (5) Cspo; (6) Cpo;
(7) Clat .
Theorem 19
The following classes of frames are bm-stable: (1) Csym; (2) Cref ,sym; (3) Cbip; (4) Clip; (5) Cbil.
Hence,
Corollary 15
The problem of deciding the preservability under taking generated subframes of sentences with
respect to the following classes of frames is undecidable: (1) Call; (2) Cref ; (3) Ctra; (4) Cref ,tra;
(5) Cspo; (6) Cpo; (7) Clat .
Corollary 16
The problem of deciding the preservability under taking bounded morphisms of sentences with
respect to the following classes of frames is undecidable: (1) Csym; (2) Cref ,sym; (3) Cbip; (4) Clip;
(5) Cbil.
Table 1. Computability of the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with
respect to classes of frames
Class of all ... Computability References
frames undecidable [10] and Corollary 1
fin. frames co-r.e.-hard Corollary 2
reflexive frames undecidable Item (1) of Corollary 3
symmetric frames undecidable Item (2) of Corollary 3
transitive frames undecidable Item (3) of Corollary 3
reflexive symmetric frames undecidable Item (4) of Corollary 3
reflexive transitive frames undecidable Item (5) of Corollary 3
partitions PSPACE-complete [1, 2]
fin. reflexive frames co-r.e.-hard Item (1) of Corollary 4
fin. symmetric frames co-r.e.-hard Item (2) of Corollary 4
fin. transitive frames co-r.e.-hard Item (3) of Corollary 4
fin. reflexive symmetric frames co-r.e.-hard Item (4) of Corollary 4
fin. reflexive transitive frames co-r.e.-hard Item (5) of Corollary 4
strict partial orders undecidable Item (1) of Corollary 5
partial orders undecidable Item (2) of Corollary 5
fin. strict partial orders co-r.e.-hard Item (1) of Corollary 6
fin. partial orders co-r.e.-hard Item (2) of Corollary 6
lattices undecidable Corollary 7
fin. lattice co-r.e.-hard Corollary 8
bi-partitions undecidable Corollary 9
fin. bi-partitions co-r.e.-hard Corollary 10
linear partitions undecidable Corollary 11
fin. linear partitions co-r.e.-hard Corollary 12
bilinear orders undecidable Corollary 13
fin. bilinear orders co-r.e.-hard Corollary 14
8 Conclusion and open problems
Bymeans of the notion of a stable class of frames, we have given a new proof of Chagrova’s Theorem
(Corollary 1) andwehave repeatedour proof for demonstrating that,with respect to different classes of
frames, the problem of deciding themodal definability of sentences is undecidable too (Corollaries 2–
14). See Table 1 for a review of the results we know so far. The key result of our method is the fact
that for all stable classes C of frames, the problem of the C-validity of sentences is reducible to the
problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with respect to C (Theorem 1). Hence, if
the problem of the C-validity of sentences is undecidable, then the problem of deciding the modal
definability of sentences with respect to C is also undecidable. For example, by demonstrating, as
in Theorem 2, that Call is stable, Chagrova’s Theorem appears as a particular case of Theorem 1.
Moreover, if the problem of the C-validity of sentences is decidable then any lower bound on its
complexity is also a lower bound of the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences with
respect to C. For example, by demonstrating, as in [1, 2], that the problem of the Cpar-validity of
sentences is PSPACE-hard and by demonstrating that Cpar is stable, the reader may easily conclude
as a particular case of Theorem 1 that the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences
with respect to Cpar is PSPACE-hard. In fact, as proved in [1, 2], this problem is PSPACE-complete.
In order to show the stability of a class of frames, note that there is no obligation to use the frame
constructions of generated subframes and bounded morphic images, the only important thing in
condition (b) being that FF ′. See also the remark after the proof of Theorem 1.
Much remains to be done. Firstly, the frame constructions of generated subframes and bounded
morphic images that we have used to prove our stability theorems have counterparts in modal
languages with modal connectives of arity 2 and more. See [5, Definition 3.13]. We believe that
results similar to the theorem of Chagrova and our undecidability results can be proved in the case of
modal languages with modal connectives of arity 2 and more. Secondly, between worlds in a frame,
the universal relation and the difference relation are important relations that the ordinary modal
language cannot express. See [16, 21] or [5, Chapter 7]. What become the theorem of Chagrova and
our undecidability results in modal languages enriched by the universal modality (interpreted by the
universal relation), or the difference modality (interpreted by the difference relation)? Thirdly, the
proof of the undecidability of other properties (first-order definability, Kripke completeness, etc.)
has also been based on the undecidability of the halting problem concerning Minsky machines.
See [6, 7, 11] or [9, Chapter 17]. By means of the notion of a stable class of frames, can we
give a new proof of these undecidability results? Fourthly, in [1, 2], Balbiani and Tinchev have
proved that, with respect to Cpar , the problem of deciding the modal definability of sentences is
PSPACE-complete. What happens, with respect to the class of all symmetric transitive frames?
Fifthly, in [3], Balbiani et al. have introduced modal logics for region-based theories of space.
Within their context, it also makes sense to consider the modal definability of sentences. Can we
obtain for these modal logics undecidability results similar to the theorem of Chagrova and our
undecidability results? Sixthly, some of the stable classes considered in Theorems 2, 4 and 6 are
definable by universal Horn formulas. See [14]. Can we demonstrate that all such Horn classes are
stable? Seventhly, are there any counter-examples to the equivalence between the decidability of
validity in a class of frames and the decidability of modal definability with respect to the same class
of frames?
Acknowledgements
Special acknowledgement is heartly granted to the two anonymous referees for their feedback
on the submitted version of our article. We thank one of the referees who has suggested
interesting new open problems about the undecidability of the modal definability of first-order
sentences. We also thank the other referee who has remarked that some arguments considered
in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 4 have similarities with the arguments developed by Chagrov
and Chagrova in [8]. After having carefully studied this paper, we believe that the results it
contains are less general than ours. P.B. was partially supported by the Bulgarian National Science
Fund (contract DID02/32/209) and the Programme RILA (contract 34269VB). T.T. was partially
supported by the Centre international de mathématiques et d’informatique (contract ANR-11-
LABX-0040-CIMI within the programANR-11-IDEX-0002-02) and the Programme RILA(contract
34269VB).
References
[1] P. Balbiani and T. Tinchev. Decidability and complexity of definability over the class of all
partitions. In Proceedings of the 5th Panhellenic Logic Symposium, pp. 26–33. University of
Athens, 2005.
[2] P. Balbiani and T. Tinchev. Definability over the class of all partitions. Journal of Logic and
Computation, 55, 541–448, 2006.
[3] P. Balbiani, T. Tinchev and D. Vakarelov. Modal logics for region-based theories of space.
Fundamenta Informaticæ, 81, 29–82, 2007.
[4] J. Van Benthem.Anote onmodal formulas and relational properties. Journal of Symbolic Logic,
40, 85–88, 1975.
[5] P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke and Y. Venema. Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
[6] A. Chagrov and L. Chagrova.Algorithmic problems concerning first-order definability ofmodal
formulas on the class of all finite frames. Studia Logica, 55, 421–448, 1995.
[7] A. Chagrov and L. Chagrova. The truth about algorithmic problems in correspondence theory.
In Advances in Modal Logic. Vol. 6, pp. 121–138. College Publications, 2006.
[8] A. Chagrov and L. Chagrova. Demise of the algorithmic agenda in the correspondence theory?
Logical Investigations, 13, 224–248, 2007 (in Russian).
[9] A. Chagrov and M. Zakharyaschev. Modal Logic. Oxford University Press, 1997.
[10] L. Chagrova. On the Problem of Definability of Propositional Formulas of Intuitionistic Logic
by Formulas of Classical First-Order Logic. University of Kalinin Doctoral Thesis, 1989 (in
Russian).
[11] L. Chagrova.An undecidable problem in correspondence theory.The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
56, 1261–1272, 1991.
[12] A. Church and W. Quine. Some theorems on definability and decidability. The Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 17, 179–187, 1952.
[13] H.-D. Ebbinghaus and J. Flum. Finite Model Theory. Springer, 1995.
[14] D. Gabbay and V. Shehtman. Products of modal logics, part 1. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 6,
73–146, 1998.
[15] R. Goldblatt and S. Thomason. Axiomatic classes in propositional modal logic. In Algebra and
Logic, pp. 163–173. Springer 1975.
[16] V. Goranko and S. Passy. Using the universal modality: gains and questions. Journal of Logic
and Computation, 2, 5–30, 1992.
[17] W. Hodges. Model Theory. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
[18] L. Kalmár. Zurückführung des Entscheidungsproblems auf den Fall von Formeln mit einer
einzigen, binären, Funktionsvariablen. Compositio Mathematica, 4, 137–144, 1937.
[19] S. Kikot and E. Zolin. Modal definability of first-order formulas with free variables and query
answering. Journal of Applied Logic, 11, 190–216, 2013.
[20] I. Lavrov. Effective inseparability of the set of identically true formulas and the set of formulas
with finite counterexamples for certain elementary theories. Algebra i Logika, 2, 5–18, 1963
(in Russian).
[21] M. De Rijke. The modal logic of inequality. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 57, 566–584,
1992.
[22] H. Rogers. Some Results on Definability and Decidability in Elementary Theories. University
of Princeton Doctoral Thesis, 1952.
[23] H. Rogers. Certain logical reduction and decision problems. Annals of Mathematics, 64,
264–284, 1956.
[24] H. Rogers. Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability. McGraw-Hill, 1967.
[25] H. Sahlqvist. Completeness and correspondence in the first and second order semantics for
modal logic. In Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, pp. 110–143. North-
Holland, 1975.
[26] M. Taıˇtslin. Effective inseparability of the sets of identically true and finitely refutable formulas
of elementary lattice theory. Algebra i Logika, 1, 24–38, 1962 (in Russian).
[27] A. Tarski. Undecidability of the theories of lattices and projective geometries. The Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 14, 77–78, 1949.
[28] A. Tarski, A. Mostowski and R. Robinson. Undecidable Theories. North-Holland, 1953.
[29] R. Vaught. Sentences true in all constructive models. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 25, 39–53,
1960.
